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There are two possible readings of the current situation in the Eurozone 
(EZ). The first is to focus on the fact that we have weathered an existen-
tial crisis and come out stronger; we are in the seventh year of an eco-
nomic expansion with unemployment at a 20-year low. Grexit is behind 
us and there are today more euro area members than at the beginning of 
the crisis. A slowdown is indeed ahead, but we have the tools and mech-
anisms to handle it; it is not likely to be a violent asymmetric shock like 
a decade ago.
The alternative reading suggests that despite putting in place significant 
reforms which helped defuse the crisis, nothing much has happened in 
the last five years. The institutional architecture of the euro area remains 
frozen in its current state since 2014: the banking union is not complete, 
the “new” fiscal toolkit is clearly in need of an overhaul, the so-called 
“Euro area budget” is insignificant, and the “backstops” are not at their 
full potential. The doom-loop between banks and sovereigns is alive and 
well, and countries continue to diverge rather than converge. To cap it 
all, we are nearing the limits of what monetary policy and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) can deliver, while countries disagree strongly on 
using the limited existing fiscal space.
In a non-crisis setting, policymakers have lost momentum on reform. 
By doing so, however, they take a large political and economic risk: at 
worst, we will not be prepared for the next crisis; at best we will watch 
“eurosclerosis” creep back. Instead, they should rise to the occasion. The 
right time is now, with a new European Commission (EC) outlining its 
priorities and unveiling a plan for a “new Green Deal”, a new European 
Parliament (EP) about to discuss the EU medium-term financial frame-
work, and a succession at the helm of the ECB which can take it further 
on the road so perfectly captured by the “whatever it takes” 2012 state-
ment. And the current environment, with no inflation, negative interest 
rates, and new conditions for competition, is conducive to bold initia-
tives.
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But while the timing and conditions may be right, we seem to be stuck. Political “windows of opportunity” have come and 
gone, and yet we seem to be reverting to traditional stereotypes where the euro area core is from Mars and the periphery is 
from Venus. The elusive compromise between risk-sharing and risk-reduction seems out of reach; instead we have become 
deadlocked in all the reform areas outlined in the 2015 Five Presidents report (already a watered down version of the 2012 
Four Presidents Report).
In a banking union, the crucial missing piece, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), is facing resistance. Count-
er-cyclical stabilisation tools, such as the socially appealing European Unemployment Insurance, are still on the drawing 
board while a European Safe Asset that would help financial stability is lost in the details of the various possible schemes. The 
proposed euro area budget is a pale version of a central fiscal capacity. And while there is near-consensus that fiscal rules are 
pro-cyclical, too complex and will likely fail again, we cannot find the political will and common ground to change them.
What is striking in this situation is the stark contrast between clear support of the euro and the EU by Europeans and the po-
litical gridlock that prevents us going forward. How does one break this? We submit that the key is two-fold. Firstly, to fund 
European investment by moving decidedly to give the EU its own resources, divorced from national budgets, and secondly, 
to focus such investment around European public goods. These steps do not replace the need for a genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) reform, but without them no such reform will be possible.
Giving the EU its own resources is the only way to overcome country divisions on EU spending from national budgets. A sur-
vey conducted in 10 member states by YouGov, together with the School of Transnational Governance of the EUI (Florence), 
backs this. European citizens are deeply divided on the extent to which their national budgets should provide more funding 
for the EU, but, instead, there is an overwhelming support for new own resources at European level, such as supra-national 
levies on emissions (a carbon tax), internet companies, or business profits in general. This suggests the best way to push the 
debate forward would be to sever the link between national budgets and the EU budget and instead develop mechanisms for 
own resources linked to economic activity at EU level.
The second tool would be using the new “Green Deal,” and the mission ethos it entails, as a way to unblock the fiscal debate. 
We should be focused on investment capacity where European common goods are at stake. Our aim should be to leverage 
European capital for an innovative, inclusive and sustainable society which embraces technology. A green pact with public 
and private investment related to environmental transition, climate adaptation, infrastructure and skills upgrading can pro-
vide the lever necessary to reinvent the European economic and social model.
This is not a solution for everything. As stated, the case for the rest of the EMU reform agenda remains strong; there are 
welfare-enhancing gains from EZ macro stabilisation policies. And green bonds are not a stability instrument; we will still 
need a central fiscal capacity with ability to tax and borrow. Therefore, a safe asset which would in a sense be the provision of 
a common good and represent a true leap in EMU. But to move the debate forward, we need to focus on EU own resources 
and aim for a new “Green Deal.”
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SESSION 1: TAKING STOCK OF EMU REFORMS
The session kicked off with a short introduction noting that while 
fiscal reforms characterised the beginning of the crisis, in the last 
five years little has happened (no repairing the roof when the sun 
is shining). In general, one can distinguish two reform periods: 
pre-2012, with emergency reactions/tools; and post-2012 (an at-
tempt at systemic transformation). One important question to 
pose is why economic science could not convince politics in time 
on the weaknesses of the system. 
The first speaker addressed three 
issues: why we still need to dis-
cuss fiscal reform; the state of 
play; and what is on the table. 
The “why” relates to the fact that 
the job is not done; we have di-
vergence between countries, not 
convergence. The EZ is not prepared for the next crisis; nor is it 
able to generate the level of investment required for the transition 
due to climate change, or population ageing. The current weak 
fiscal situation is also jeopardising the conduct of monetary pol-
icy. 
To understand the state of play, we need to go back to the Maas-
tricht Treaty; the rules vs. discretion schism in policy stance across 
countries has polluted the debate. But the current environment, 
with no inflation, negative interest rates, new conditions for com-
petition and a need to finance the Green New Deal is an ideal one 
for a discussion on fiscal rules. This is despite the fact that the cri-
sis has fuelled populism, and that countries such as those in the 
Hanseatic League oppose any change.
In terms of what is on the table, there are three categories of issues. 
The first is fiscal rules: the non-implementation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) and the need for its reform/simplifica-
tion; next to it, the fact that the Macroeconomic Imbalance Pro-
cedure (MIP) does not work and that output gaps are problem-
atic. In this vein, the question of investment, an issue identified 
with the creation of the European Fund for Strategic Investments 
(EFSI) or InvestEU, needs to be part of fiscal rules; we should 
think of using the Green New Deal as a way to unblock the fiscal 
rules debate. 
The second category of issues relates to the banking and capi-
tal markets union. It used to be about risk-reduction; now more 
risk-sharing seems to be required before it is completed. It was 
also a tool to keep the UK in; now this is less of an issue. In any 
case, the idea that a full banking and capital markets union could 
avoid having to give the EU a fiscal capacity is wrong. Finally, 
there is the issue of EZ governance: the European semester, the 
contract on structural reform, fiscal capacity, etc. 
“ We did not repair the roof 




Introducing the seminar, the organisers noted that the timing for 
holding a seminar on fiscal rules and fiscal capacity was very ap-
propriate: a new EC outlining its priorities, a new EP about to 
discuss the medium-term financial framework and a succession 
at the helm of the ECB. It is the right time to take stock of what 
has been achieved in this regard since the beginning of the crisis, 
recognise that the work is not complete, and give a fresh impetus 
to the ongoing debate on the appropriate tools and stance for fis-
cal policy in the short and long term for the EZ and the EU as a 
whole.
On substance, the reform debate covers a wide range. In terms 
of policy tools and the new EMU institutional architecture, the 
discussion centres around the need (and form) of an EU-wide 
stabilization function, a central fiscal capacity, a European safe 
asset, the evolution of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
a framework for debt restructuring and the need to complete 
the banking union. This is complemented by a debate about the 
appropriate fiscal stance and the need to revisit the fiscal rules, 
as well as to equip the EU with the fiscal capacity necessary to 
achieve its long-term growth potential. 
This policy brief is the outcome of the High-Level Policy Dialogue (HLPD), organised by the School of 
Transnational Governance of the European University Institute, on “Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Capacity,” 
which took place in Florence on 23 September 2019.  
The HLPD brought together a group of policy makers, academics, and members of civil society and 
the private sector to have an open discussion on this issue. The HLPD took place under the Chatham 
House Rule, whereby no attribution of opinions expressed can be made. The topics discussed have been 
summarised for the purposes of this paper. 
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There have been a number of proposals in the context of the 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF); but the EP proposal 
to use it as leverage for a fully-fledged stabilization function was 
blocked. The proposal on the table on the other hand (Meseberg) 
is weak. On automatic stabilisers: the proposal by the Spanish 
government (inspired by the resolution fund) makes most sense. 
Regarding the future of ESM: it needs to be fully integrated in 
the Treaty; but the sovereign debt discussion makes the whole 
process more complex. Overall, however, it is clear that political 
constraints have hit in – the Council cannot go further.
The second speaker suggested that the main question which needs 
to be addressed is whether the current EZ is resilient enough for 
the next crisis. The speaker outlined the reforms undertaken to 
date (Six-Pack, Two-Pack, Fiscal compact, etc.) and noted that 
not all were successful. The crucial ones were the creation and 
evolution of the ESM as well as Outright Money Transactions 
(OMT); the most problematic has been the MIP. Since 2014, there 
has been no reform; the EZ architecture is the same as it was 5 
years ago.
The situation today is one where many EZ countries have not 
recovered fully form the crisis; but where the space for mone-
tary policy is limited – not because there is nothing left to do, but 
rather because there will not be agreement for further measures. 
This leaves fiscal policy; but that is characterised by: fragility of 
sovereign debt; problematic fiscal rules; no EZ stabilization tool 
and refusal to use available fiscal space; and a still in operation 
sovereign bank doom loop.
The fragility of sovereign 
debt stems from the fact that 
the ESM has no instrument 
for a liquidity crisis. The 
Precautionary Conditioned 
Credit Line (PCCL) is not 
the right tool for this; the cri-
teria in place make it that it 
could never be accessed. At 
the same time, OMT is not 
accessible easily (due to the conditionality criteria); we therefore 
need a new instrument at the ESM or to reform PCCL criteria. 
Fiscal rules are pro-cyclical, too complex, but Finance Ministers 
are not willing to change them; we will therefore have to rely on 
Commission flexibility. In terms of the EZ stabilization tool: noth-
ing of substance is in sight; the budgetary instrument for conver-
gence and competitiveness replicates what other instruments do.
Finally, the banking union remains incomplete: we may have a 
backstop but EDIS has been postponed again. Overall, the EMU 
architecture may be better, but the EZ is still ill-prepared for the 
next crisis. When the crisis comes, we may have to rely on a joint 
national fiscal response as we did in 2008-9 as nothing of what 
was proposed in the Five Presidents report has been decided.
The third speaker reminded everyone that initially the EZ crisis 
was considered to be a Greek/fiscal crisis; in fact, it was a crisis 
of excessive borrowing, but the fiscal narrative suited Germany 
and the Netherlands. It was noted that countries joined what they 
thought was a convergence union; but is now a divergence union. 
The model is broken, and the promise is undermined, so that 
with the next shock, capital will flow north again. The speaker 
suggested that we put too much focus on the financial element; 
but the single market only exists for a small fraction of goods, and 
not for services. 
In the same vein, we are focusing too much on second-order 
problems; not on where growth will come from (how will Bul-
garia be able to access German service markets?). We are increas-
ing the mobility of capital but not of labour. Banking union may 
not be a panacea; if there had been one (with EDIS), it may not 
have solved the problem but instead made it worse, as the bank-
ing union could increase the size of imbalances. Similarly, we 
may be thinking the wrong way when wanting to break the sov-
ereign-bank loop: if there is no home bias, it amplifies the shock; 
home bias stabilises the system in the event of a small idiosyn-
cratic shock. Finally, the speaker suggested we need to ask the 
fundamental questions which have not been addressed, such as 
the appropriateness of the 3% deficit and 60% debt rule. 
In the ensuing discussion, the 
idea that we contracted the union 
for convergence was opposed by 
one participant; it was suggested 
instead that it is simply supposed 
to create the environment for 
such a convergence to happen. 
And over the longer period, there 
has been convergence (except for Italy and Greece); in the shorter 
period, possibly also Spain. In general, no-one thought the ECB 
would play the role it has played; on the other hand, the ESM has 
not gone far enough.  
The issue of convergence was echoed by another participant: con-
vergence was never a promise as such. It was also pointed out that 
the lack of advancement in EZ governance since 2014 coincid-
ed with the upturn. This begs the question of whether to pursue 
what is doable vs. what is desirable. In the current environment, 
is it enough to work at the margin? In reality, we need a big leap 
forward.
How we can best push reform in a reluctant setting was addressed 
by another participant: use the green new deal as a hook? Try for 
a limited number of watered-down proposals, or push for more? 
Another participant responded that it is important to distinguish 
between tools (old vs. new) and outcomes; the real new elements 
are the ESM, banking union, and the MIP, while the European 
semester is not - strictly speaking - connected to the crisis.
The discussion then moved to the question of how well equipped 
we are for a potential new recession. A participant noted that the 
period since 2008 has had a strong differential impact on cer-
tain countries. But today is a very different situation: 2008 was a 
breakdown, while today the external imbalances are perhaps less 
of an issue. The underlying problem remains however; there is 
an unequal distribution of real economy imbalances. Important 
countries are not using the available fiscal space and no instru-
ments can be used at EU level. In this environment, if we push, it 
should be for one point: fiscal coordination around public goods.
Another participant suggested that the problem is not whether 
we are ready for the next recession; it is that we have a lot of un-
finished business. But the transfer union discussion is one that 
young people do not understand and has no political support. 
“ If we are to push for only 
one thing, it 
should be fiscal 
coordination for 
the pursuit of 
public goods
”
“ What can be good for one 
country, may 
not be for the 
whole system
”
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SESSION 2: A EURO AREA BUDGET
In introducing the session, the moderator stressed that the issue of 
the EU having its own resources cannot be divorced from politics. 
Survey results were presented conducted in 10 Member States by 
YouGov together with the School of Transnational Governance of 
the EUI which suggest that while there are strong divisions across 
countries (north/south) on national vs. EU spending, the picture 
changes when asked about taxes at the European level (for which 
there is a clear majority support). This suggests the best way to 
push the debate forward would be to sever the link between na-
tional budgets and the EU budget and instead develop mecha-
nisms for own resources linked to economic activity at EU level, 
such as a carbon tax, internet companies, or business profits. 
The first speaker suggested that the incomplete EMU remains a 
fragile construction and may not be strong enough to handle the 
next crisis. In this context, fiscal policy should have a role beyond 
automatic stabilisers to prevent supply-side damage when multi-
pliers are high and monetary policy is constrained. The EZ fiscal 
framework should allow for an EZ fiscal stance, as an extra layer 
on top of national policies. Improving macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion should include centralised fiscal capacity and a safe bond.
“ In the Eurozone, there are 
multiple 
equilibria: the 
core is from 
mars, the 
periphery is from 
Venus
”
Reviewing the last 10 years, 
the speaker suggested that 
before the crisis, fiscal policy 
was not considered appro-
priate for economic stabili-
sation; monetary policy was 
thought to be a more flexible 
and effective tool. The Great 
Recession has led to a change 
of views; few now question 
the appropriateness of mas-
sive fiscal stimulus to rescue banks, companies and people in 
2008-09. Today, the risk of recession is very real; we are back to 
extraordinary times. Echoing Draghi, fiscal policy will soon be 
called into action. But the EZ does not have much fiscal space, 
nor is it well distributed. The overall EZ fiscal stance suggests fis-
cal policy has been tighter than anticipated. While Germany as a 
stand-alone country would seem to be doing fine, a much tighter 
fiscal policy lowers its potential growth. 
Instead, we need to focus on creating a new smart fiscal union; 
leverage European capital for an innovative/inclusive society is 
what there is support for; it is about the new economic model that 
Europe needs.
One participant returned to the issue of the convergence prom-
ise of EMU not being fulfilled. It was suggested Germany would 
say that certain countries had the wrong policies; but what can 
be good for one country may not be so for the whole system. On 
labour mobility, the question was whether we want to encourage 
more migration to core countries; new countries and southern 
countries are currently losing the most skilled people. 
At this point in the discussion, it was suggested by another par-
ticipant that we are focusing on secondary problems; we have 
the wrong diagnostics. We are focusing on symptoms (the fiscal 
rules); these are consequences of broader problems. Liquidity is 
one; capital flows and financial instability is the problem we need 
to resolve. The Maastricht Treaty was a leap into the future, with 
many aspects yet to be determined. Now we do not have the US to 
back us up anymore; it is therefore an opportunity to think ahead. 
The huge flaws in the EZ architecture were stressed by one par-
ticipant, who suggested we distinguish between crisis response 
vs. architecture issues. The blow can come from capital markets, 
and in that sense, home bias by banks may not be a bad thing. 
Convergence was not a promise as such, but we did promise that 
national economies do not break down. In the EZ, Germany has 
been the big winner; risk-sharing in this sense is essential and the 
focus on risk-reduction is misplaced in the context of a union. 
We need a fiscal policy stance at EU level; the EU budget as it 
currently stands is completely inadequate.
In recapping the discussion, one of the initial speakers reminded 
the group that the Maastricht Treaty was about convergence, with 
SGP as the tool. We have failed to make a common understanding 
of the fact that in a currency union 1+1 does not equal 2. The Eu-
ropean semester and coordination were imperfect substitutes for 
having a real economic tool. In this context, the Euro area budget 
proposal on the table is dangerous as it will close the debate. 
Another of the speakers referred to the question of tactics on how 
to move forward: best would be to pick low-hanging fruit but keep 
the bigger picture in mind. We need to look for new approaches, 
though it is not clear the political consensus is there.
“ Someone needs to buy what Germany exports; not everyone 
will have a surplus
”The third initial speaker stressed the “convergence aspiration” at 
the start of the EZ process. The speaker argued that we have an 
asymmetric approach to fiscal and trade deficits (bad) and sur-
pluses (good); but someone needs to buy what Germany exports 
- not everyone will have a surplus. On labour mobility, it was rec-
ognised that in the short run, it is a risk for small countries, but in 
the longer run it has benefits, and so should be encouraged. In 
contrast, cross-border movement of capital should not be an end 
to itself; supervision is essential for proper capital allocation.
While concluding, the moderator stressed the importance of 
all aspects of stocktaking: the tools, outcomes, plus the learning 
process, which needs to become institutionalised. Reforms and 
back-pedalling go hand in hand: we need to address this. In this 
context, there is one question of agency: who can drive the nec-
essary reforms.
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Overall, the EZ seems to be characterised by multiple equilibria 
(the core is from Mars, the periphery is from Venus). The rede-
nomination risk has not disappeared, and the doom-loop is alive 
and well. In this environment, there is a clear case for a European 
safe asset and fiscal capacity for the EZ; their absence will lead 
to an amplification of shocks. There are welfare-enhancing gains 
from introducing EZ macro stabilisation policies (removal of the 
“doom loop”, more fiscal space, smoothing the economic cycle).
The next speaker provided input on the legal perspective, and es-
pecially the positions taken by the German Constitutional Court 
(GCC). Looking back, in the review of the Maastricht Treaty, 
the GCC managed to avoid the subject of monetary union. The 
Lisbon Treaty (2009) was deemed compatible with the German 
constitution, but the GCC laid a lot of red tape. In the Europe-
an Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) case, the German govern-
ment must retain control even with inter-governmental decisions 
(same with ESM). The OMT case was the first reference of GCC 
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ); the ECJ confirmed OMT 
was compatible with the Treaty (i.e. did not constitute monetary 
policy), and the GCC reluctantly accepted this. The GCC is ex-
pected to rule on the ECB Public sector Purchasing Programme 
– PSPP (successor of OMT).
In general, revenues and expenditures need to be under the con-
trol of the German government; this will be violated if levies are 
supra-nationalised “to a considerable extent”. Moving forward, 
the issues at stake revolve around the powers and competences of 
the German government and EU authority, as well as democracy 
i.e. the role of the German parliament and increasingly the Euro-
pean Parliament.
The third speaker noted that there is stark contrast between clear 
support of the euro and the EU by Europeans vs. political grid-
lock that prevents us going forward. The timing (with a new EC, 
EP and head of ECB) provides an opportunity to advance; there 
are significant expectations for concrete action in a context of a 
recovery with upcoming risks. Migration, climate change, the 
economy are the top 3 concerns in the Eurobarometer opinion 
surveys, while the role of digital, fintech, green financing and AI 
all change the agenda; we need to accompany this change. The EP 
is committed to putting more into EMU integration, in an envi-
ronment where the problems are in the Council. But the Instru-
ment for Convergence and Competitiveness proposed by the new 
EC President-designate is problematic. 
“ The debate should be 
focused more 
on investment 
capacity than on 
fiscal capacity
”
In the discussion that fol-
lowed, there were questions 
on whether changes in EP rep-
resentation would be enough 
to respond to GCC criticism 
of EP, on why the GCC would 
object to supra-nationalised 
levies when it did not seem to 
object to the financial transac-
tions tax (FTT), as well as on the exact relationship between the 
GCC and the ECJ. It was also remarked that it is important to 
make a distinction between downturns vs. a “crisis” requiring a 
response to a “sudden stop”.
One participant noted that the GCC not considering EP to be 
“fully democratic” in essence undermines European construc-
tion. Regarding the German fiscal stance, it was pointed out that 
according to Commission forecasts for 2019 and 2020, Germany 
has fiscal loosening; but EC forecasts have been wrong (Germany 
tightened in 2018). Based on domestic fundamentals, one cannot 
argue Germany’s fiscal stance is wrong, but German fiscal policy 
does not take into account its external effect on the EU as a whole.
Another participant suggested that a single European asset is too 
ambitious; it was needed in 2010, but less now. It was argued that 
the debate is disproportionate between fiscal capacity and invest-
ment capacity where it should be focused, and in particular on 
the role of public and private sectors for ventures and infrastruc-
ture investments. There are 16 trillion euro sitting in deposits in 
European banks; but only 13 euro per capita from InvestEU. In 
response, one participant noted that the question is how to mo-
bilise the 16 trillion: you need an instrument at EU level such as 
a safe asset. Another added that what is controversial in the EU is 
spending on current expenditure; less on counter-cyclical invest-
ment spending. Hence it is important to look at tools and sources 
of capital; there are many positive Net Present Value (NPV) proj-
ects going unfunded. 
More questions were raised on the functioning of the GCC: 
whether own EU resources would be easier for it to accept, rath-
er than committing German funds; the distinction in the way it 
treats the EIB and the ESM (in the former case, no need for scru-
tiny for each decision, as in the latter); and what happens if the 
GCC disagrees with some decision of the ECB. It was also sug-
gested that the taxing power of EU presents a political problem in 
some member states as well as an issue of control.
In response, one of the initial speakers contended that the GCC 
believes the EP is over-federalised; the EP represents “citizens” (as 
in the Lisbon Treaty) and not “peoples”. The GCC has opposed 
extending the 5% threshold for entering parliament in national 
elections in the German EP elections. More generally, the EU as a 
federal state is not acceptable to the GCC (it is deemed against the 
German constitution). However, the 1949 German constitution is 
actually quite open on an EU federal state (but in this respect it 
is important to look at decisions after reunification). It was also 
noted that if the GCC (which is still in unanimity mode, even 
on issues that have Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)) says that 
some ECJ ruling is not compliant with the German constitution, 
in principle this should lead to an infringement procedure. Nev-
ertheless, the GCC talks informally with ECJ to avoid such situ-
ations. 
In general, GCC members believe they are the last stand to de-
fend the constitution (and the GCC enjoys the highest esteem of 
all institutions in Germany); but they have some margin of ma-
noeuvre as they feel the responsibility of economic consequences 
of GCC decisions. At the end of the day, if something is necessary, 
they will come through. Finally, on the ECB, the “functional” ar-
gument of ECB independence is respected by the GCC.
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Introducing the session, the moderator referred to evidence 
that the euro area is more unequal today than before the crisis. 
Strengthening the euro area in this context means addressing four 
related themes: 1) risk-sharing and stabilization policies in nor-
mal times; 2) dealing with severe crises (“a robust crisis manage-
ment mechanism”); 3) resolving a debt crisis (the euro ‘debt over-
hang’); and 4) developing ‘safe assets’. The moderator suggested 
that addressing the first of these - risk-sharing and stabilization in 
normal times - through a Stability Fund as a ‘constrained efficient 
risk-sharing mechanism’ also in practice helps address the other 
three. 
The first speaker in this session suggested that we should not be 
as negative about the current situation; the fiscal rules are deliv-
ering (and the European Fiscal Board agrees with the EC on this). 
EMU governance is made of a tripod: rules; market discipline; 
and institutions – and all three elements need to work. 
“ A European Safe Asset is 
required for 
a true leap in 
EMU
”
Regarding fiscal rules, the 
SGP has gone through a num-
ber of phases: SGP0 (1997); 
SGP1 (2005); SGP2 (2011); 
SGP3 or SGP 2.1 (20??). Its 
future reform needs to be fo-
cused on delivering simplici-
ty, adaptability and predict-
ability. Market discipline is not working yet; sovereign bonds in 
the euro area are exposed to self-fulfilling developments. This re-
flects fragmented and asymmetric national bond markets as well 
as lack of a (national) lender of last resort leaning against ever 
greater capital flows. The lack of a common safe asset is one of the 
drivers of negative interest rates (scarcity of AAA bonds); it af-
fects monetary policy transmission and is also connected to the 
international role of the euro. 
It is time to consider a common safe asset for a true leap in EMU; 
the EC examines various versions but has not made a proposal. A 
safe asset would: help financial stability (address banks sovereign 
exposure, act as common anchor against flight-to-safety flows, 
eliminate risks or fear of redenomination, help overcome global 
scarcity of safe assets); foster economic growth (mitigate distor-
tions in financing costs, facilitate monetary policy transmission, 
create conditions for better allocation of capital, support better 
risk-sharing); and buttress financial sovereignty/economic secu-
rity (store of value and payments system, support international 
role of euro, reduce exchange rate risks for euro area businesses). 
In terms of institutions, when they are strong and accountable, 
they can afford fewer rules. We need a European Representative 
for Economy and Finance; strengthen the role of the EP; a eu-
ro-area Treasury (common issuance); more community method 
(Fiscal Compact and ESM brought into the Community meth-
od – they were both shot down). This would allow us to deliver 
within the original 2025 objective. But we need to move in all 
directions (rules/market discipline/institutions and build trust/
consensus amongst MS; before that we need to identify what is a 
“steady-state” EMU and what is needed to achieve it.
The second speaker in the session suggested that the economic 
case for a central stabilisation function is clear; but it is not only 
an economic issue. It is also linked to social outcomes; long-term 
growth; and structural issues. In the social sphere, the lack of so-
cial pillar highlights the importance of a European Unemploy-
ment Insurance scheme. In terms of growth outcomes, the lack 
of stabilisation leads to hysteresis effects, skills degradation etc. 
There is also a link to economic structures: tradable vs. non-trad-
able sectors.
In this context, it is important to avoid the image of a transfer 
union (and it is amazing that it is an issue in stabilisation); these 
are often simply temporary transfers which are subsequently re-
versed. A lot of asymmetric shocks are endogenous in the EU and 
linked to structural imbalances. In pursuing the reform agenda, 
the Green New Deal is one of the new ideas, but care should be 
taken that it is not unequally distributed. 
“ The lack of an effective social pillar highlights the importance of a 
European Unemployment Insurance 
scheme
”The third speaker raised three issues: what type of financial inte-
gration we want; the risk-sharing/risk-reduction debate; the need 
for a range of policy instruments operating jointly. The speaker 
suggested shadow capital markets have become a problem and 
that risk-sharing should not apply to finance only; some fiscal 
risk-sharing is necessary. Regarding the debate around the “trans-
fer union”, it was argued that it is important to distinguish be-
tween systematic transfers vs. transfers related to dealing with 
asymmetric shocks.
With respect to the safe asset, the speaker suggested there are 
problems with (all) different versions; its design should enhance 
stability of the while area and not just some countries. It was ar-
gued that the whole reform approach by EU institutions has been 
piecemeal, not strategic. On other issues, sovereign debt restruc-
turing should not happen automatically; while macro positions 
should be addressed symmetrically. 
In the ensuing discussion, one participant argued that there are 
a number of unanswered questions on the European safe asset; 
amongst these are its objective (liquidity? collateral? contingen-
cy?), its underlying liability and the question of what it is in fact 
funding. It would seem that the preferred ESBies solution would 
not do the job. In general, the safe asset would not be comparable 
to US Treasury bonds (no Fed window backing it); risk varies and 
no government bond without a central bank can address that. 
ECB deposits in banks could instead act as a proxy for the safe 
asset. Finally, it was argued that the current distribution of power 
in the EU (often blocking reforms) should not be taken as given: 
SESSION 3: FISCAL OR OTHER STABILISATION TOOLS
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Germany used to be the sick man of Europe; it might be so again.
Another participant focused in the issue of policy conditionality, 
whether it works and how it should evolve. As it stands, condi-
tionality makes sure adjustment takes place, but not the quality 
of adjustment; there are questions about horizontal measures vs. 
targeted ones; about too much fiscal, and not enough structur-
al. New instruments should therefore be more focused on real 
reforms, notwithstanding concerns about intruding on member 
states.
One participant argued that we cannot escape the issue of bur-
den-sharing and subsidiarity when discussing the safe asset. 
Furthermore, environmental transition and climate adaptation 
through a green pact with bonds related to social and green as-
pects should not be seen as a solution for everything. Such policy 
tools are future-oriented and not a stability instrument; we will 
still need a safe asset.  
In responding, one of the speakers suggested that the safe asset 
would in effect transform national bonds into something like 
municipal bonds. There are multiple objectives of common safe 
assets and a high-level working group is currently looking at fi-
nancial stability and safe assets. The discussion will focus on two 
models: ESBies and e-bonds; the latter bridge fiscal and financial: 
an entity borrows and then lends to MS, with all other bonds sub-
ordinated. 
Another speaker pointed out that behind all schemes is a 
risk-sharing idea; but to politically sell any fiscal stabilisation you 
need to avoid the idea of chronic payers and chronic receivers. 
The European Unemployment Insurance is socially very appeal-
ing and can be addressed to those most vulnerable; it can get pol-
icy momentum, just like skill-building policies. But as always, the 
devil in the details; its design needs to combine it with company 
responsibility.
SESSION 4: CAN WE HOPE FOR MORE? PUSHING THE FISCAL DISCUS-
SION FURTHER
The first speaker started by reminding participants that the euro 
creation was the highest form of political integration, directed by 
high politics (German reunification); economics was not central 
to its creation. The EZ was a French project to contain Germany; 
instead we have ended up with a German-led system but where 
the leader is unhappy (even though it has benefited most).
In the euro area, we have always been late in dealing with the cri-
sis (Obama: EU crisis measures are always $1 short and 1 day too 
late). With existing risks to EMU, we risk making today a huge 
political mistake by not completing required reforms and fuelling 
populism. We know the costs of undoing are large, but we cannot 
advance with reforms because of differing interests, cognitive dis-
sonance and low trust between us. The prospects are that despite 
the completed reforms, the euro is not robust enough for the next 
crisis (which would be different); and when the next crisis comes, 
political elites will find it harder to reach agreements. 
“ The euro creation was the highest form fo political integration; 
economics was not central to its 
creation
”The second speaker suggested that the euro area has flourished 
economically in the aggregate but not symmetrically.  The Greek 
debt crisis would not have happened if Greece had not joined the 
euro; but we solved it. Banking and capital markets union remain 
disgracefully incomplete; the only capital market that exists is the 
one coming from London to EU. On public investment and pri-
vate finance: we need to find better ways of leveraging; a lot of 
design work needs to be to be done to leverage taxpayer’s money 
to invest in the future.
The third speaker argued that a few things were broken during the 
crisis that make moving forward harder. Among these is the “per-
missive consensus” (i.e. moving forward by stealth). But small re-
form steps are not enough anymore. The first-best response would 
be a central fiscal capacity with the ability to tax and borrow; it 
emerged in 2012, then was lost. The counter-cyclical stabilisation 
function has vanished as well.
“ Only in crisis do we have the 
energy for reform; 
when not in crisis, 
the threshold for 
reform is very high
”
The second-best is better 
coordination of national 
policies; we tried (MIP), but 
this has also failed. EU insti-
tutions have also failed (the 
Commission 2016 propos-
als were slapped down by 
Germany; and the ECB has 
come too late to ask for fis-
cal stimulus). We are therefore left with third-best: the fiscal rules 
cannot be met but cannot be reformed; the SGP cannot be strict-
ly followed. This has led to a gradual exasperation by a number of 
member states.
At this point, it is better to refuse reforms than accept unsatis-
factory ones. There is still some space for movement: one is the 
MMF; the other is the European Unemployment Insurance which 
is coming back (other participants disagreed on this being the 
case). Also, fiscal rules can also be tinkered with (and the Green 
New Deal is an opening). Political and democratic reforms (such 
as transnational lists) might also help convince Germany to grant 
the EU more executive authority and own resources.
In the ensuing discussion, one participant suggested that it is use-
ful to play the devil’s advocate to the calls for urgent reform: after 
all, the EU economy is in its seventh year of expansion; unemploy-
ment is at a 20-year low; the threat of Grexit is gone; Brexit has 
solidified the EU; and compared with the rest of the world (US, 
China, Russia), the EU is doing reasonably well. There may be an 
economic consensus (outside Germany) for reform, but we need 
to be able to answer a number of questions: whether we are really 
in danger (as the tail risk seems to be gone); whether the risk is 
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economic or political; whether it is an extreme risk or simply the 
EU not realising its potential. And in terms of instruments, we 
need to make clear distinctions: those required to avoid a crisis; 
to deal with it when it happens; and to make the system work bet-
ter in normal times.
Another participant remarked that while policymakers may feel 
less the urgency for reform, the role of economists is to advise 
politicians. Brexit represents a withdrawal of European consen-
sus, while during the crisis the fact that we were too late/too little 
was very costly. The current situation might be sustainable in the 
short run but is destroying confidence in the EU project. The new 
leap of integration which is required has a clear political dimen-
sion. But it faces obstacles: for example, the euro has loosened the 
need for structural reforms and the crisis has reduced the appe-
tite. In terms of specific reforms under discussion, EDIS is a ques-
tion of political trust, while the resulting banking union should 
allow for the emergence of pan-European banks. 
One participant reflected on the fact that the Commission May 
2017 EC paper on the future of Europe offered alternatives for 
moving forward. We are often trying to do too many things: better 
to do less better. We should be expanding taxes on public goods 
for the union. We do not have an immediate problem, but if a 
problem arises, we have little policy space. The EU is facing both 
internal and external challenges There is a lot of dissatisfaction on 
what we are getting out of the EU.
Responding to the public goods issue, another participant sug-
gested that in a sense the safe asset is a case for the provision of 
a common good; it is about Germany leaving the German bund 
just like it gave up the D-Mark. More generally, it is necessary to 
recreate a narrative on common goods, based on two elements: 
the external threat (even Germany realises it cannot do it alone); 
and the green dimension.
The “crisis conundrum” was raised by one participant: only in cri-
sis do we have the political energy to do reforms, but this is limit-
ed (an “urgency bias”); when not in crisis, there is little incentive 
– i.e. the threshold for reform is very high. This is different from 
the past (such as in the creation of the Single market); a series of 
conditions seem to have taken away the political incentives for 
reform.
Another participant reminded everyone that emerging markets 
after the 1990s concluded that self-insurance was part of the 
answer; it is possible the EU will end up with large suboptimal 
self-insurance mechanisms. There is no existential threat, but de-
lay has a cost. The question is whether we can bear some political 
and maybe financial cost to come closer to a better equilibrium; 
and the hope is that we will not need a fresh “existential crisis” to 
get us going.
The question of whether heads of state and governments are as 
gloomy as most of the seminar participants was raised. It was sug-
gested that EU economies are probably in a normal slowdown; 
there is no catastrophe, but also no incentive for wholesale re-
form. The challenges therefore may be less about crisis manage-
ment than about going back to eurosclerosis. The business com-
munity pushed for change back then; it is doubtful we can rely 
on that. But populism has mobilised also those that are against it 
and want to defend Europe; a new constituency (young, educat-
ed) will fight back. 
“ Economically, the situation could continue as if for some time; but 
politically speaking, the tail risk is very 
large
”
In responding to the discussion, the first of the session speakers 
suggested that economically, the situation could carry on as is for 
some time. Politically speaking however, we are only one election 
away from a disaster in some country; the tail risk in political 
terms is very large. 
The second session speaker addressed the broader issue of the 
necessary components for peace and prosperity as the EU moves 
forwards: embracing the role of technology in society (which 
changes communications as well); a unitarian (environmentally/
socially) society with cohesion and normal politics; and playing 
to our strengths by combining public and private.
Finally, the last of the session speakers suggested that while it is 
understandable for politicians to be complacent, it should be rec-
ognised that in all the discussion, Germany is the elephant in the 
room. German politicians they never made an effort to explain 
to Germans that they are the biggest beneficiaries of the EZ; and 
Germany may budge only when it feels vulnerable (in terms of 
external threats, the climate, or its own banks).
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